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THE IMPLIED RESERVATION
DOCTRINE: POLICY OR LAW
John A. Carver, Jr.*

I

WILL first comment on Professor Corker's questions, because my answers add a dimension to the title of Frank
Trelease's paper. Dean Trelease discusses "problems" created
by the reservation doctrine; Mr. Corker's questions and my
answers add up to a "solution" created by the reservation
doctrine. It is not a good solution, but I am confident that if
the situation he posits should ever arise, the implied reservation doctrine would be called upon to keep the licensee of Pelton Dam in business.
The Federal Power Commission does not purport to grant
water rights to its licensees. Section 9 of the Federal Power
Act specifically requires that an applicant for a license submit evidence of compliance with state laws "with respect to
bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use
of water."' Section 27 specifies that Congress had no intention of interfering with state laws "relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation
or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein." 2 Section 14, which deals with recapture of projects
after license expiration, contemplates that water rights shall
have been acquired other than by grant of the FPC.'
Commissioner, Federal Power Commission; A.B., 1939, Brigham Young
University; L.L.B., 1947, Georgetown University; Member of the Idaho and
District of Columbia Bar Associations. Mr. Carver was formerly Under
Secretary of the Interior and Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public
Land Management.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 802 (1964).
2. Id. at § 821.
3. Id. at § 807.
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It may be significant to note that the licensee of Pelton
Dam was denied the right to intervene in the proceedings after
certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court to the
Ninth Circuit's decision reversing the Commission's order
granting the license." The real party in interest was the Oregon
Fish Commission, and water rights questions were seemingly
not in issue. The Federal Power Commission's General Counsel had occasion in 1962 to give his version of the case in testimony before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, and he strongly emphasized that no water rights
question was intended to be litigated.
As Professor Corker seems to suggest, however, the rationale of Pelton Dam' would permit the Federal Power Commission, if necessary, to determine that the licensee could proceed to build without a certificate of an Oregon agency and
that it was validly the owner of the requisite water rights. If
this were the case, there is little doubt in my mind that a court
would refuse to rule that the federal licensee could now be deprived of its water by Oregon action. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the language of the Federal Power Act, but
not fatally so.
The second question suggests a latter-day FirstIowa proceeding,6 in which the underlying assumption is that some
forum would take jurisdiction of a case predicated upon an
assertion by the sovereign state of Oregon that without its certificate, the licensee has no water right, and so must give way
to an appropriator who possesses the necessary Oregon certificate. Alternatively, it might be argued that the failure of the
licensee to secure a state certificate initially left the company
exposed to the obligation to recompense a subsequent wouldbe appropriator for the value of the water which the latecomer presumably could have had free if the dam had not
been built.
The assumption is unlikely, but the question merits discussion in the context of our discussion today because of the
4. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. F.P.C., 328 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'g.,
Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 28 F.P.C. 924 (1962).
5. F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
6. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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extreme likelihood that the lawyers of both the company and
the government would rely on the implied reservation doctrine,
and not FirstIowa.
This brings me back to Dean Trelease's able paper. He
has pointed out the difficulties generated when federal water
needs encounter private rights, while Professor Corker has
opened the question of the difficulties generated when private rights encounter water needs of federal licensees. As
Dean Trelease says, "anyone who has read any Supreme Court
water cases since FirstIowa will start giving odds on the outcome without waiting for further details."
I agree with Frank and Charley both on the matter of the
efficacy of quantification, and on how the problem will be
approached by government lawyers. To the extent Charley
takes a more extreme view, I agree with him, about the uselessness of the exercise looking 40 years ahead.
As Mr. Trelease notes, I agree that a sensible system of
water rights ought to include security, and it ought to eschew
uncompensated transfers from one user to another as a matter
of policy. In this, my biases are public. I did my best to have
the Department of the Interior support the Kuchel-Moss bills.
I have plowed the same ground that we are presently discussing (with a sincere acknowledgement then and now to Charley
Corker) in a paper in the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Review.7 And my public career has been devoted to the effort or
trying to persuade the United States as a landowner to subject
itself as a matter of sound policy, not Constitutional requirement, to the same rules that govern private landowners.
Frank Trelease's assessment of the strength of the bureaucratic instinct to avoid the charge of having given away federal
rights is correct. Congress therefore must be explicit, and the
whole Public Land Law Review Commission Report is dedicated to the very proposition that guidelines should be
specified.
7. Carver, A FederalPolicy for Development of Western Water, 14 ROCKY Mr.
MIN. L. INST. 473 (1968).
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It is paradoxical therefore that in this particular chapter
of the Commission's Report, there is a lapse from that standard. To illustrate, I post two hypothetical questions. Since I
am the last speaker on this panel, I cannot address them to my
colleagues.
A. If the implied reservation doctrine were translated
into legislative language, and Pelton Dam and Arizona v California8 did not exist, would the Public Land Law Review Commission recommend its enactment as a sound policy, consistent
with the Commission's overall consensus?
B. Suppose the Congress had, in fact, enacted a statutory equivalent of the implied reservation doctrine in the
middle of the last century; suppose further that the statute
had not been utilized by the federal government until the time
the Glenn case' came up, at which time the long forgotten
statute was discovered and successfully pleaded in the Utah
federal court: would the Public Land Law Review Commission have taken a different view about an old and almost unused statement of Congressional intent, than it has now taken
about the implied reservation doctrine?
I am suggesting that the Commission regards court-made
law less susceptible to Congressional amendment than statutory law. Of course, we do not have here the situation of
Miranda," where the Congress was effectively blocked from
disagreeing with the Court by any means short of the process
of amending the Constitution. Both the Commission and Dean
Trelease (the latter more clearly than the former) avoid the
trap of saying that the Constitution mandates the implied reservation doctrine. One would gather from reading the Commission Report, however, that all of us ought to be more deferential to a judicial "doctrine" than to a statutory law.
This point can be illustrated by considering a variation of
the second hypothetical question. If, instead of discovering
in 1963 that the Congress had all the time intended in this policy, we had found that the Congress had in fact explicitly stated
8. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
9. Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah, Mar. 16, 1963).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the policy, but for one reason or another it had never been applied, I venture to say that we would find the Commission
spending little time with the policy implications. By removing the unused statute from the books, only one concrete situation which actually relied upon it would be affected, the
Glenn situation, and as both Frank and Charley have said,
the factual situation there would disclose an absence of a real
issue.
Several students of the Public Land Law Review Commission's Report have suggested that it would have been useful for some of the suggestions to be framed in legislative
language. In the matter of federal-state water rights, I believe that job has already been done well by Northcutt Ely,
and I will close my comments on this subject by reading language on this subject which he suggested to the Senate Interior
Committee in 1961.11 Mr. Elys' handiwork begins with a subsection as follows:
"The provisions of section 1(b) of the Flood Control Act
of 1944 ... shall apply to all works hereafter constructed by
or under the authority of the United States west of the ninetyeighth meridian." By footnote to his discussion of this language, he explains that this section subordinates uses of water
for navigation to uses for irrigation and domestic purposes,
in areas west of the 98th meridian. He says it does not affect
the authority of the United States or its licensees to construct
works, and does not touch conflicts between navigation or
power functions and other nonconsumptive functions such as
preservation of fish and wildlife.
"Any right to the consumptive use of water claimed by
the United States under the laws of any State shall be initiated and perfected in accordance with the procedure established y t,-e Laws of that Sate." This, .Mr. Ely e
.lns,is derived from sections 7 and 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902.
The proposed language applies only where the United States
claims an appropriate right under State law, but in such a
11. Hearings on Problems Arising from Relationships Between the States and
the Federal Government with Respect to the Development and Control of
Water Resources, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 123 (1961).
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case requires the United States to conform to the administrative procedure established by the State for the establishment
of such a right. It negatives the asserted "right of self-help."
"No vested right to the beneficial consumptive use of
any waters, navigable or nonnavigable, which is recognized
by the laws of the State in which such use is made, shall be
taken by or under authority of the United States without
compensation." This language, according to Mr. Ely, does
not deny the supremacy of the Federal commerce power, but
does recognize the existence and compensable character of
rights generated under State law which may be taken in the
exercise of the plenary Federal Commerce power.
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